Abstract: This paper reports a work in progress. We extend a simple, complete-information model of executive-legislative bargaining over policy devised for the U.S. to fit the case of Venezuela. We first deal with two major differences between the two systems: Venezuelan presidents have a weaker veto than their U.S. counterparts, and Venezuelan presidents can initiate bills. Two main predictions follow from the model's assumptions: no veto should ever occur, and no executive-sponsored bill should ever be defeated; the logic behind both hypotheses is anticipation. The evidence from Venezuela (1959Venezuela ( -1995 falsifies both predictions, suggesting that some of the model's assumptions are too restrictive. We make tentative suggestions of what a more complete model should look like.
I. Introduction
How do chief executives in presidential systems obtain legislative passage to enact their policy programs? Apparently, this varies a great deal as we move from North to South in the Americas, the continent whose constitutional tradition is intimately associated with presidential government. In the U.S., where the legislative agenda is firmly under the control of legislators, presidential legislative success depends heavily on the majority status of the president's party in Congress (Bond and Fleisher 1990; Edwards III, Barret, and Peake 1997) . When the legislative party fails, the president has the possibility of directly appealing to voters in order to put pressure on leaning members of Congress (Kernell 1993 ; but see Baum and Kernell 1999) . When all else fails, the president also possesses the formal faculty to return unpalatable legislation to the assembly, thus forcing it to secure a two-thirds majority in support of it. This veto faculty is essentially a reactive power, which usually allows more conservative presidents to protect the legislative status quo from an opposition Congress (Kernell 1991; Kiewiet and McCubbins 1988) .
Party support is also fundamental for the accomplishment of presidential goals in Latin American presidential systems (Coppedge 1994b; Mainwaring and Shugart 1997b) . However, in stark contrast to the U.S., many Latin American presidents are granted substantial pro-active legislative powers, an asset which greatly helps them shape the legislative agenda independently from the size of their party support Cox and Morgenstern n.d.; Figueiredo and Limongi 2000; Londregan 1999; Shugart and Carey 1992 ).
Yet pro-active legislative powers -such as introduction of legislation and decree authority -do not tell the whole story of presidential policymaking capacity in Latin America. At least two additional features of some Latin American presidential regimes which differentiate them sharply from the U.S. model, and are potentially of great import for the legislative performance of presidents south of the U.S.-Mexico border. The first feature is constitutional in nature: the size of the majority required in the assembly to override a presidential veto (see Carey, Amorim Neto, and Shugart 1997; Magar 1998) ). In the U.S. a presidential veto is overridden by a vote of no less than two-thirds of the members of each house of Congress. Some Latin American countries also require such majority (e.g. Argentina, Bolivia, and Chile), but other presidential constitutions establish that a bare absolute majority of the assembly is sufficient (e.g. Brazil and Colombia), or even a plurality (e.g. Venezuela). In some countries there is no veto on one class of legislation approved by the legislature -the budget, the most crucial piece of legislation -(e.g. Costa Rica, Mexico, Honduras). In another the assembly has no override faculty on most legislation (Ecuador).
The second feature is para-constitutional: the appointment of coalition cabinets. Amorim Neto (1998) , Deheza (1998) and Thibaut (1998) show that the frequency of coalition governments in Latin America is higher than expected by comparative theorists of systems of government (Jones 1994; Lijphart 1992; Linz 1994) . Approximately half of the cabinets appointed in Latin America in the 1980s and 1990s were multiparty arrangements.
How do these two differentiating features affect the legislative strategies available to Latin American presidents? What predictable effects does a change in the size of the overriding majority have on presidential policymaking capacity? Do multiparty cabinets actually boost the legislative performance of the executive under separation of powers? Comparative scholars are only beginning to answer questions such as these from an empirical standpoint for non-U.S. presidential systems. In this paper we address the questions above, and proceed as follows. In the next section we develop a simple spatial model of executive-legislative policymaking in presidential regimes to isolate the effects of different veto overrides. We then focus on the consequences generated by a 50% + 1 veto override majority. Our main hypotheses are that, assuming complete information, (1) under such override requirement no veto should be issued by the president, and (2), when proposing bills to the legislature, the president should make proposals palatable to the leader of the coalition controlling the assembly; consequently, no executive-initiated bill should suffer legislative defeat. The third section tests the hypotheses on comprehensive data on legislative input-output in Venezuela in 1959-1995, a case of an absolute majority override requirement. This period constitutes the heyday of the pre-Chávez democratic regime, during which Venezuelan politics operated under a stable party system and a relatively stable set of rules. The evidence refutes both hypotheses, although the first falsified to a lesser extent than the second. Then, we relax the complete information assumption and set out to identify the factors that led Venezuelan politics away from the predicted trend relating to the issuance of vetoes and the fate of executive-initiated bills. We posit that while position-taking strategies followed by presidents and legislative parties partly explain the defeat of executiveinitiated bills, coalition cabinets help presidents boost their legislative record. These propositions are then econometrically tested and are found to be correct. Section four concludes.
II. A model of policy-making in presidential systems
We rely on a spatial analogy to describe the decision-making process under a stylized presidential constitution and the bargaining process between the branches of government. Spatial models are a useful analytical tool that isolates a couple of traits of the policy-making process (for a good comprehensive review see Enelow and Hinich 1990; also Magar 1998) . The parsimony of this type of approach to the study of political phenomena explains, in great part, the increasing popularization of spatial models in the discipline. Phenomena as diverse as candidate/voter relations under different electoral systems (e.g., Cox 1990; Downs 1957 ) and legislative/bureaucratic relations under democratic government (e.g. Calvert, McCubbins, and Weingast 1989) have been modeled spatially. We extend here the now classic setter model (Romer and Rosenthal 1978) to the bargaining process between the legislature and the executive under separation of powers (cf. Baron and Ferejohn 1989; Cameron 2000; Kiewiet and McCubbins 1988; Krehbiel 1998) .
The VSoP game. We intend to portray decision-making under a presidential system as a game of strategy. We thus introduce a combination of players and rules of play that strips a presidential constitution to its fundamental features. The rules of the Venezuelan Separation of Power (VSoP) game mimic a presidential system by separating the power to change existing policy between two independent branches of government, the executive and an assembly.
The game is played by three players, whom we call P, L, and V. Player P represents the president, the head of the executive branch of government. The unicameral assembly, on the other hand, is represented by the pair of remainder players: player L represents the leader of the party or coalition controlling a majority of seats in the assembly, while player V (also referred to as the veto-override player) is the last member of the assembly needed to form a coalition capable of overriding a presidential veto.
The decision-making rules under a presidential constitution are mimicked by the sequence of play of the VSoP game, portrayed in extended form in Game Tree 1. Player P moves first: he or she decides whether or not to initiate a bill (denoted x P ) to replace the status quo policy (denoted by SQ). This decision branches the game into two subgames, both starting with a move by L. In the top subgame in Game tree 1 player L, upon receiving the president's bill x P , chooses whether to pass it (thus ending the game with a change in policy from SQ to x P ), kill it (hence retaining policy SQ as the outcome), or amend bill x P into a new bill x L . If there was an amendment player P moves again, choosing whether to accept bill x L (replacing policy SQ) or veto it. In case of a presidential veto the bill is returned to the assembly where player V gets to choose whether to sustain the veto (hence retaining the SQ policy) or override the veto (hence imposing x L as the new policy).
[GAME TREE 1 ABOUT HERE]
In the bottom subgame, player L faces a simpler choice, choosing whether to pass a new bill x L after the president failed to initiate one, or to retain the SQ policy. If x L is passed by L the remainder of the bottom subgame parallels the end the top subgame after L opts for an amendment: P may veto or accept and V may sustain the veto or override it, with the same distribution of outcomes.
Note that decision-making in the U.S. can be portrayed simply with the bottom subgame of the VSoP game (cf. Kiewiet and McCubbins 1988) . Since the U.S. president cannot initiate a bill the first move would correspond to L. Presidential initiative makes the VSoP game resemble policy-making in most of Latin America. We still refer to the game as Venezuelan because, as in the U.S. case, it lacks a feature contained in several other of Latin America's constitutions: the president is not granted a faculty to decree new policy without prior passage in the assembly.
1 In section III we will elaborate on the formal rules that govern decision-making in Venezuela.
Solving the VSoP game requires an evaluation, for each player, of what strategies bring him or her the highest welfare given what other players are predictably going to do. The solution involves a definition of what welfare means for each player, as well as a mechanism allowing each to compare any two alternatives. The simplest way to take all these factors into account is by means of a spatial model.
The spatial model. Models of this sort portray a given policy as a point and, as indicated by their family name, they distinguish one policy alternative from another by placing their corresponding points in different coordinates in space. The smaller the distance between the two points, the larger the similarity between the policies they represent, and vice versa. The policy space is the field on which the game is played.
Another component of spatial models is the assumption that players have preferences over policy, and perhaps more importantly that any two players' preferences may be quite different from one another. Each player considers one policy alternative to be his or her "ideal point" in space, regarding all other policy points as less desirable. Every player's preferences are captured by his or her utility function, which establishes a transitive ordering of all feasible policy alternatives. We rely on the simplest kind of preference mechanism, based on distance. We thus assume that, for any player, alternative A is preferable to alternative B if A lies closer to his or her ideal point than B (regardless of the direction); he or she is indifferent if A and B are both as distant from the ideal (again, regardless of direction).
Finding equilibria of spatial games played in multi-dimensional policy spaces requires several relatively sophisticated auxiliary assumptions. We avoid these complexities by assuming that all policy alternatives can be mapped into a uni-dimensional policy space, a simple left-right continuum.
The game is easier to solve by introducing the notions of cutting-point and preferred-to set. A player's cutting point is that point in space that he or she finds indistinguishable from policy SQ. We denote each of these cutting points by p, l, and v (non-capitals distinguish them from players' labels), and define them as the symmetric projection of SQ on the policy space using the player's ideal point as the axis. Figure 1 portrays the location of the players' cutting points: p, l, and v, relative to their ideal points: i P , i L , and i V , and SQ. Geometrically speaking a player's cutting point is the symmetric projection of SQ on X using the player's ideal point as the axis.
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] A player's preferred-to set is the set of points contained in the segment delimited, on one end, by his or her cutting point and, on the other, by SQ.
2 Denote a player's preferred-to set by a ℘ subscripted by that player's initial (in Figure 1 , preferred-to set are delimited by the semicircles centered in players' ideal points). Because utility functions are symmetric, a player will prefer all points contained inside his or her preferred-to set to the status quo -all are closer to the ideal -whereas he or she will prefer the status quo to any point outside his or her preferred-to set -all are further away from the ideal.
With ℘ P , ℘ L , and ℘ V solving the game becomes quite straightforward. The equilibrium concept we rely on is sub-game perfection, a solution guaranteeing that, in equilibrium, the threats players make at any stage are in fact credible (Schelling 1960) . Sub-game perfect Nash equilibria are derived by solving a game backwards: last nodes first, then up the game tree (Morrow 1994:128-33 The claim results from solving the game with backward induction.
Step one. Player V, located in the last decision node of Game Tree 1, faces a straightforward choice (regardless of whether in the top or bottom portion of the game tree). V will simply have to choose that move which maximizes his or her utility with no other strategic considerations. Which option accomplishes this end, of course, depends on what the bill x L looks like. V gets to play only if P, in the previous move, opted to veto the bill sent by L to his or her desk. V's option to sustain the veto or to override it is equivalent to a choice between retaining SQ if the veto is sustained, or bringing policy to x if the veto is overridden (Kiewiet and McCubbins 1988) . With the ℘-sets it becomes easy to determine V's best reply to any proposal x L : "Override a veto if the bill in question is within ℘ V ; sustain the veto otherwise."
Step two. Moving backwards brings us to P's choice to sign bill x into law or veto it, thence letting V move as prescribed in Step one. P will sign bill x L into law if x L is contained by ℘ P . However, if x L is not included in ℘ P , there are two possibilities (looking downwards in the game). First, if x L falls within ℘ V a veto will be overridden by V -imposing x L as the new policy outcome despite the veto. A veto under this scenario, unless valued per se by P, would be outcome-equivalent to signing the bill upon arrival to P's desk: in both cases the outcome is x L , with some economy of legislative steps in the latter case, though. Since the present model ignores the possibility of P drawing utility from a veto qua veto, we conclude that P would sign x L in to law. Second, if x L is not in ℘ V a veto will be sustained by V, thus retaining SQ as the law of the land.
These considerations permit the deduction of P's best reply to any bill
Step three. Another level up Game tree 1 brings us to the nodes where L gets to move. The top and bottom parts of the game need to be analyzed separately because L faces a choice of slightly different actions in each. In the bottom node, L gets to choose whether to retain the status quo or propose a bill and, in the latter case, which bill x L to send to P's desk. We will simplify the logical picture by restricting i L ≤ SQ (the argument is no less generalizable because when i L > SQ the situation is merely symmetric). Three cases need to be considered here.
Case (a). L is free to propose his or her ideal policy whenever his or her ideal point is included in ℘ P , simply because the president will sign it into law. The same occurs if i L is included inside ℘ V , in this case because V would override any veto, thus imposing the bill as the new outcome over the P's contrariety. I L is included in either Figure 2 (a) illustrates a situation of this kind: faced with a proposal x L = i L the President would rather retain SQ, yet faces a Veto-player with contrary preferences (x L = i L ∈ ℘ V ); a veto would thus be overridden.
[FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE] Case (b). If neither p nor v are to the left of L's ideal point, then x L = i L is vetoed with no possible override, hence bringing no improvement in L's utility (unless, of course, there were some value in a veto qua veto for L, which is not the case in this game). There may be, however, gains to be made for L by making a concession to some other player. If i L < p < SQ a compromise bill at x L = p falls within ℘ P and is, thus, accepted by the president. Alternatively, if i L < v < SQ a bill at x L = v falls within ℘ V and is, consequently, veto-proof. If both i L < p < SQ and i L < v < SQ, then L has leeway in choosing to send x L at p or v, whichever is lowest (i.e. closest to i L ). Figure  2 (b) illustrates this latter scenario, with L sending an optimal bill x L * = v.
Case (c). Finally, if both p and v are to the right of SQ there are no gains to be made through concessions. The reason is that any bill that either P or V would accept is to the right of SQ: concessions are way worse than the status quo from L's standpoint. Any bill acceptable to L (below SQ) is outside both ℘ P and ℘ V : their proposal returns the status quo again, with a loss of time. Thus, unless L would have something to gain from a veto -again, something not contemplated in this version of the game -L will prefer to retain SQ under this scenario. When the top half of the game is being played, L receives a bill x P from the President and has to choose whether to amend it, pass it, or kill it. The decision is similar in essence to that of the bottom branch. L will use the same rationale to amend x P into a bill x L under the same conditions presented above. If changes to the SQ that L finds desirable are not feasible (i.e. vetoproof) then, instead of amending x P , L will decide to kill it (mirroring the situation in the bottom node). If there are veto-proof changes to the SQ, then L will amend x P into a feasible x L (again, mirroring the conditions above); if x P happens to be that policy, then L will pass it with no amendment.
This boils down to the following best-reply for L when the top part of the game is being played: "In case either p or v are to the left of i L , then propose x L = i L (or pass x P if x P = i L ); in case either p or v is (are) between i L and the SQ then propose x L = p or x L = v , whichever is lowest (or pass x P if x P is the lowest of p or v); if both p and v are to the right of SQ refrain from making a proposal and kill any proposal sent by the President."
We finally reach the initial node of the game, where P gets to choose whether or not to initiate a bill in the assembly, and if yes, what bill exactly. The president knows, from looking down the game tree, that a bill initiated by him will only survive if not amended and if the bill follows the criteria used by L in drafting a bill. So unless there is something to win from having the assembly amend or kill an executive-initiated bill, the president's role in the initiation process is purely anticipatory.
Since players are choosing reciprocal best replies this strategy combination is in equilibrium, completing the proof of Proposition 1.
The Paradoxical Nature of Vetoes. A critical assumption that underlies the model just presented, which we have not mentioned so far, is that players are playing a complete information game. The derivation of the equilibrium above is constantly taking advantage of the fact that each player knows the utility function of the other players -i.e. he or she knows the exact location of the other players' ideal points in space. L, for example, upon calculating where to situate a new proposal x L (if at all), locates the cutting points of P and V in space, and concocts a strategy accordingly.
One of the known paradoxes of complete information games is that anticipation eliminates all observable instances of conflict. Wars should never occur according to complete information models of geo-politics; strikes should never burst in complete information models of labor markets. If each country knows the adversary's tolerance for recalcitrance, and each knows the outcome of an eventual war, the weakest side, in anticipation, should make enough concessions to leave the enemy indifferent. Wars should never occur.
The same paradox rises in the VSoP game. The following hypothesis is a well known implication of Proposition 1 (Kiewiet 1988, p. 731) . The Nil Veto Hypothesis. The president-legislature policymaking game, in equilibrium, will not produce vetoes under any circumstance.
It follows from Proposition 1 that, if there is a veto threat, L will seek to accommodate the preferences of V in order to obtain his or her support for a successful override, thus circumventing the bite of the veto. The president, upon receipt of such compromise bill on his or her desk, knows (by the complete information assumption) the outcome-uselessness of a veto, and instead signs the bill into law (with an economy of legislative steps). If such a compromise with V is not feasible, then L initiates no bill at all, again diverting the occurrence of a veto.
Likewise, another relevant hypothesis following from Proposition 1 and the complete information assumption concerns the fate of executive-initiated bills. Recall that in Game Tree 1, the VSoP game starts with a decision by the president to propose or not a change in the status quo. Where would he set policy at? The president knows that if x P ≠ i L , x P is irrevocably bound to be either amended or defeated. So in equilibrium a president would only submit bills at i L . This results in the following hypothesis: The Nil Presidential Defeats Hypothesis. The president-legislature policymaking game, in equilibrium, will not defeat executive-initiated bills under any circumstance.
The same reason that leads the president not to emit any veto also explains why none of the bills he eventually proposes to the assembly should be defeated. As stated above, his role in the initiation process is purely anticipatory. By this logic, when the president decides to initiate a bill, he or she will set policy where L would accept it -the president simply sends the bill that L would have initiated him or herself.
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In the next section we analyze whether the empirical record allows to reject or not the hypotheses drawn from a complete-information spatial model of decision-making in Venezuela.
III. The Case of Venezuela, 1959 Venezuela, -1995 Under the now defunct 1961 Constitution, the Venezuelan chief executive was elected by plurality for a five-year term. Presidential and congressional elections were concurrent. Presidents could only be reelected after 10 years have elapsed since they last held office. The president appointed his cabinet without restriction. Individual ministers, however, could be censured by a two-thirds vote in the Chamber of Deputies. With respect to constitutional legislative powers, Venezuelan presidents were weak compared to some of their Latin American counterparts (Crisp 1997; Mainwaring and Shugart 1997a; Shugart and Carey 1992) . Except for the budget, they had no power of exclusive introduction of legislation. Also, they had no constitutionally guaranteed decree authority. The executive could only issue decree-laws after Congress enacted an enabling law delegating to the president authority to do so. Moreover, the delegated decree authority could only be used to deal with matters relating to appropriations, revenues, the creation and abolition of public services, monetary policy, and to maintain order. According to Crisp (1997) , given that the passage of an enabling law required majority support in Congress, the general pattern observed in Venezuela was that only presidents whose parties commanded a legislative majority were delegated decree authority. This means that party support was essential for presidents to activate all the weapons the Constitution potentially grants the executive.
Moreover, Venezuelan presidents held a weak veto over bills. Article 173 stated that the president could return a bill within 10 days with suggested changes. Overriding the president's objections required a two-thirds vote by Congress in a joint session. Yet a simple majority (a plurality) of the joint session was sufficient to send the bill back to the president, who could return it again within five days. In case, however, a president did so, a simple majority of a joint session could promulgate the bill into law without the president's signature. This means that a plurality was, de facto, capable of overriding a presidential veto in Venezuela in its pre-1999 democratic period.
Evidence for Hypothesis 1. Table 1 displays the number of bills returned per president and the number of laws enacted per legislature in the 1959-1994 period. The number of returned bills is impressively small. Three presidents never returned a bill, namely Betancourt, Leoni, and Pérez I. Two presidents returned only a single bill, Caldera I and Pérez II. Campíns and Lusinchi returned 5 bills each. However, interim president Velásquez, in his few months in office, returned 2 bills; and Caldera II returned 6 bills.
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]
The numbers are, however, pretty small, especially when seen from a comparative perspective. Table 2 provides a rough, but illustrative, picture of veto incidence in presidential systems. Venezuela indeed stands at one end of our small distribution, with 20 vetoes in 37 years. The 11 first vetoes, which occurred between 1959 and 1989, contrast with the 860 bills that were signed into law by the executive immediately after Congress sanctioned them in the same time period (a ratio of 78 bills signed for every bill vetoed). Argentina until 1976 presents a similar picture (a 50:1 ratio), followed by the U.S. [TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] All in all, the number of vetoed bills in Venezuela in 1959-1995 meets our expectations to a certain extent, but not to the point of allowing us to say that Hypothesis 1 is confirmed. So this should motivate further inquiry on veto politics in Venezuela.
Possible Explanations for the Occurrence of Vetoes
Recent analyses of executive-legislative bargaining have started to incorporate some of the factors highlighted in the more qualitative literature as driving vetoes. In this sub-section we overview the potential role that incomplete information (Cameron 2000) , electoral concerns (Magar n.d.) , and going public strategies (cf. Kernell 1993) might play in the case of Venezuela.
Incomplete information. The results drawn from the model presented in the previous section rely on the fact that each players knows the location of the ideal point of all other players. With this (complete) information, they can fine-tune the policy proposals they make so that they leave others indifferent and get some gains from the game. Given that preferences are not observable, it seems very plausible to suggest that the complete information assumption is too strong. Adding a little uncertainty about the location of the adversary's ideal point opens the door for mistakes (one may under-estimate the size of concessions needed to get a veto-proof bill) and for a strategic use of uncertainty (if one appears more conservative than he or she really is, one will get larger concessions).
Venezuela, however, is not a case where this argument could stand. It is the two-thirds override requirement that drives vetoes-caused-by-uncertainty in the U.S. The question behind vetoes boils down to whether it will be sustained by V or not. In Venezuela, where the same coalition who supported a bill can override a veto, there is no question of whether the bill was fine-tuned enough to convince the V player of an override because the V player is included in the coalition who voted for the passage of the bill. For this reason, Venezuela is a good test case: there is a fairly good argument to suggest that uncertainty is not a driving factor.
Position taking. Vetoes are highly noticeable political events. Because conflict and confrontation rate highly among audiences, newscasts tend to highlight instances when a president vetoes a bill in their opening lines or front cover. Given the salience of a veto, it can be reasonably suggested that politicians will seize the occasion in their search for opportunities to advertise the positions they stand for in their quest for (re-)election. Vetoes can be interpreted as position-taking exercises. Magar (n.d.) has actually altered the model's assumptions to include a bit more sophisticated players. Players in his model have a secondary goal ("to advertise what I stand for") in addition to the one in the model above ("to bring outcomes as close to my ideal as possible"). In a study of U.S. state governments he finds evidence that, controlling for a number of other factors, the incidence of vetoes follows the electoral cycle. Politicians seem to switch to a position-taking behavior as elections approach: executives emit vetoes that they know will be overridden in order to show that they tried to impede a bill's publication but the assembly insisted; similarly, legislators send bills to the executive that they know will be vetoed (with no possible override) to bring evidence about their ideals.
In Venezuela there is no evidence of a similar behavior. Table 3 lists when each of the 20 bills were returned by the president to the assembly. Vetoes in Venezuela occurred almost 1,000 days before the end a president's term, that is, the president remained, on average, 2 years and 9 months in office after the veto. The standard deviation around that mean is relatively small, one year five months approximately. The vetoes that occurred closer to the next election were those issued by Ramón Velásquez (vetoes #13 and #14), the one-year interim president who finished Carlos Andrés Pérez's term: the closeness to the election is quite artificial in this case.
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE]
So, contrary to the evidence in U.S. state governments, Venezuelan vetoes seem not to be driven by position-taking concerns.
Going public and delay. When the Venezuelan president returns a bill to Congress, a joint session has to be called, and a new discussion and vote of the bill has to take place. This is very likely to give the president and those who oppose the bill some more time under the SQ. How much time? Table 4 below reports the delay caused by the 20 vetoes in the promulgation of the relevant law. It is impossible to know when a bill that was returned would have been promulgated had it not been returned to Congress. We do know, however, either the date the bill was sanctioned by Congress (and submitted to the president for publication) or the date the bill was returned to Congress. Using this date as a proxy for the original sanctioning date and comparing it with the date the bill was eventually promulgated in the Gaceta Oficial, vetoes in Venezuela delayed laws 4 and a half months on average, with some variation around this statistic. The minimum delay was 3 weeks.
[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE]
More interestingly, three, maybe four, of the bills that were returned by the president were effectively killed by this maneuver. If the same coalition that favored a bill in the first place is sufficient to insist on a bill after it has been returned, how come overrides ever fail? The fact that this occurred in Venezuela suggests that vetoes may, under certain circumstances, change the nature of a bill. A legislator who was willing to vote in favor of a bill may change his or her mind after it has been returned by the president. Why?
A veto, because of its notoriety, may well change the salience of a bill. An issue that was somewhat hidden from the public's eye is highlighted by a veto. This phenomenon parallels Kernell's going public strategy, frequently used by U.S. presidents (1993) . However, so far we have no information that would allow us to state whether this ever happened in Venezuela.
Evidence for Hypothesis 2. Due to the absence of a constitutionally granted decree authority, the primary method Venezuelan presidents in the pre-Chávez period had to promote their legislative agendas was by initiating statute bills in the Congress. Hypothesis 2 expects that no executive-initiated bill would be defeated in Venezuela. What does the available evidence tell us about it? Executive-initiated bills represent 34.2% of all the bills introduced in the lower chamber in the period analyzed. Surprisingly, there is substantial variation in legislative success across presidencies. While president Campíns, who led a minority COPEI administration in 1979-1984, only had 50% of his legislative agenda approved, AD president Lusinchi (1984 , whose party commanded the largest legislative contingent in Venezuela's democratic history (56.5% of lower chamber seats), achieved a 89.5% success rate. Another important observation is that all minority presidents -Leoni (AD, 1964 (AD, -1969 , Caldera (COPEI, 1969 (COPEI, -1974 , and Campíns (COPEI, 1979 (COPEI, -1984 had a poorer performance than majority ones -Betancourt (AD, 1959 (AD, -1964 , Pérez (AD, 1974 (AD, -1979 , and Lusinchi (AD, 1984 (AD, -1989 . Overall, Hypothesis 2 failed blatantly. Why?
Why Were Executive-Initiated Bills Defeated
One possible reason for the defeat of executive-initiated bills may also have to do with electoral strategies and position-taking, although these factors were found not apt to explain the vetoes issued by Venezuelan presidents. Note first that there were two types of presidents in Venezuela with regard to their governing status, namely, majority and minority. As for minority presidents, they, as presidential candidates, ran on publicly advertised policy promises. Their direct election by the people bound them to at least initiate their electoral platform, no matter its fate in Congress. One can plausibly surmise that failure to do so could be very costly in terms of public approval and trust. Moreover, although Venezuelan presidents were not allowed to run for a consecutive term, it is fair to assume that they had strong incentives to help their parties perform well in the next presidential and congressional elections. To accomplish that, minority presidents could use congressional battles to advertise the efforts they have spent in accomplishing the policy promises on which they were elected. This is also position-taking. After a congressional defeat, presidents were always too eager to point the finger to opposition intransigence and blind partisanship as the cause of their failure to pass the executive's agenda. Playing a position-taking game with an opposition Congress could be used as a means by which a minority president, on the one hand, could help his party shore up electoral support for congressional races. On the other, the majority opposition in Congress also has strong incentives to defeat the president's agenda so as to boost the opposition's chances to win the next presidential election. If this much is true, then bills initiated by minority presidents should have been more often defeated as a new electoral cycle approached.
In regard to majority presidents, it is even more puzzling that they also suffered legislative defeats. However, Coppedge (1994a, pp. 94-135) shows that AD, the only party that elected majority presidents, despite being tightly disciplined on the floor of Congress, was plagued by factionalism. Because presidents were not allowed to run for a consecutive term, factions formed within the AD mainly to contest the presidential succession. As the presidential term came to an end, factional strife became more and more intense. The rise of factions within AD was also prompted by differences of outlook between the executive and the party. Upon taking office, AD presidents were concerned with interests other than those of his party. Consequently, as Coppedge puts it, This broader perspective leads them [the presidents] sooner or later to take actions that are contrary to the interests of their party, and an executive-party crisis heats up as a result. The different perspective of government and party are therefore said to cost an executive some support within his party (p. 129). So there is ground to argue that the electoral cycle affected the legislative support of majority and minority presidents, and this should be reflected in more legislative defeats late in the president's term. What does the evidence say about it?
How can we check whether the fate of executive-initiated bills was affected by the elapsing of the president's term. The fate of an executive-initiated bills is simply whether it was approved or rejected. This dependent variable is thus a dummy to which we assign the value 1 if the bill was approved, and the value 0 if it is defeated. To operationalize the elapsing the president's term, we propose the following formula:
where Nb = number of days elapsed between the beginning of the president's term and the date a bill is initiated; Pt = number of days of the president's term.
So, for example, consider a bill introduced 100 days after the inauguration of a presidency. As in Venezuela the presidential term is 5 years (1825 days), this bill's score on ELAPSE is: 1 − (100/1825) = 1 − 0.055 = 0.945. We expect that ELAPSE will have a positive sign, that is, the closer is the initiation of a bill to the beginning of the president's term, the more likely its approval. Additionally, a dummy variable tapping the governing status of the president's party (call it STATUS) will also be included in the test. It assumes the value 1 if the president's party commands a majority of legislative seats, and the value 0 otherwise. STATUS is expected to have a positive sign.
We estimated the logit equations reported in Table 6 below. This technique produces maximum likelihood estimates of coefficients measuring the effect of an independent variable on the probability that an observation falls into one category rather than the other.
As the regression output shows, ELAPSE was found significant at the 0.01 level but came with wrong sign. Surprisingly, the latter indicates that executive-initiated bills are more likely to be defeated early in the president's term. STATUS worked about as expected. It had a significant effect on the fate of executive-initiated bills (at the 0.01 level), and displayed the right sign. Setting ELAPSE at the mean, the probability of an executive-initiated bill being approved under a majority president is 0.86, while a minority president stands only a 0.57 probability of having his bills approved. Pseudo R-squared .094 N of Obs = 388 ______________________________________________________________________ * ρ > 0.01; ** ρ > 0.05; *** ρ > 0.1 All told, position-taking as measured by the electoral cycle was also not able to explain why executive-initiated bills were defeated in Venezuela in . However, the fact that the fate of those bills depends heavily on the governing status of the president's party is to some extent indicative of the impact of position-taking strategies, particularly under minority presidents. The latter are always striving to find ways to weaken the majority opposition in Congress. One way to do so is to try to show to voters that the opposition conspires against the public interest by defeating presidential proposals. However, are minority presidents bound only to devise position-taking strategies to overcome the obstacles posed by their condition?
What Can Presidents Do Other Than Position-Taking
The spatial model developed in Section II confers a mostly passive role to the president. After all, he is expected not to veto bills or to propose tailor-made bills to suit the preferences of the median legislator. Our empirical evidence, however, shows that presidents veto bills and are willing to submit proposals that are very likely to be voted down by the legislature. Yet, according to the literature on Venezuela and to the econometric test performed above, the factor that best explains the legislative performance of presidents in this country in 1959-1989 is not directly related to presidential agency but rather to the distribution of preferences in the national electorate, that is to say, the size of the president's party. Although we identified a strategic mechanism -position-taking by presidents and the opposition -that possibly mediates between the governing status of the president's party and the fate of executive-initiated bills, this analysis still leaves the chief executive with a marginal, at most reactive, role in policymaking in a Latin American presidential system such as Venezuela.
Actually, presidents can do more. The 1961 Constitution granted Venezuelan presidents the power to freely appoint and dismiss cabinet ministers. Ministerial portfolios can provide politicians with good opportunities to influence policymaking, to boost their reputation and prestige, and plenty of resources to dispense patronage and make new allies. Shouldn't presidents use the bait of ministerial posts to increase their influence over the policy process? Suppose a president with a firm grip on his legislative party, but with no majority. Suppose also that the addition of the votes of a more conservative party would create a majority. The president could make his stand more conservative, bringing his "ideal" closer to the other party's and buy their support in this fashion. But if this goes contrary to his platform and, if taken too far, will alienate his own partisans. Alternatively, the president can buy concessions from the other party by offering them some cabinet portfolio(s): this will bring the other party's ideal closer to P's, with similar limitations. Most likely, a combination of the two moves will take place. A coalition cabinet will thus shift the ideal points of P and L, bringing them closer. A coalition might also bring the ideal point of V closer to P's and/or L's. If so, then a coalition cabinet should allow the president to dodge the passive role to which he was relegated by our model based on complete information. By this logic, a coalition cabinet should have the effect of boosting the president's legislative performance (Figure 3 below presents a sketch of what a more complete CabinetVSoP game might look like).
[FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE] Table 7 below shows that coalition cabinets were actually appointed in Venezuela in 1959-1999, some of them giving a majority to a minority president (Leoni's second cabinet and Pérez's second cabinet in his second presidency), and one of them providing the president with a near majority (Caldera's first cabinet in his first presidency). Coalition cabinets were also appointed when the president's party commanded a majority (Betancourt's two cabinet). What is the impact of presidential cabinets on the legislative performance of the executive? [TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE] First, how do we operationalize a coalition cabinet? The nominal size of the cabinet could be used for this purpose. The nominal size of the cabinet is the sum of the legislative weight of all the parties represented in the cabinet. However, the problem with this indicator is that the cabinet always includes the president's party, and in the case of single-party cabinets, the size of the cabinet equates with the size of the president's party (% of lower chamber seats). The solution, then, is to find an indicator that tells us how much legislative support the cabinet adds to the president's party. For convenience, let us call it the Cabinet Legislative Surplus, which can be expressed by the following formula:
Cabinet Legislative Surplus = (S cab -S pres )/S pres where S cab = Legislative Size of the Cabinet S pres = Legislative Size of the President's Party
To arrive at Cabinet Legislative Surplus, we subtract the size of the president's party from the size of the cabinet, and then divide this value by the size of the cabinet. This indicator varies from 0 to 1. If the cabinet is a single-party cabinet, its legislative surplus takes on the lowest value, zero, because the numerator will be zero. If a president whose party commands no seat in the legislature appoints a national unity cabinet comprising members of all legislative parties, the legislative surplus of this cabinet will score the maximum value, 1 (1 -0/1 = 1).
We test the impact Cabinet Legislative Surplus on the fate of executive-initiated bills, just like we did above. ELAPSE and STATUS are again included on the right-hand side of the equation. We expect that Cabinet Legislative Surplus will have a positive sign, that is to say, the higher the surplus, the more likely the approval of a executive-initiated bill. Table 8 below reports the regression results. STATUS was found significant at the 0.01 level, and came with right sign. Again, the coefficient on ELAPSE was statistically discernible from zero (at the 0.01 level) but its sign was wrong. Cabinet Legislative Surplus had a significant effect on the fate of executive-initiated bills, and came with the right sign. Cabinets with a higher legislative surplus due to a coalition arrangement were more likely to have their bills approved. Setting STATUS and ELAPSE at their respective means, the probability of a bill being approved increases from 0.592 to 0.731, a considerable spread, if a minority president changes from a single-party cabinet to a broad based multiparty cabinet. This is precisely the case of president Leoni (1964 Leoni ( -1969 , whose first cabinet included only his party, AD, which commanded a plurality of 37.1% of lower chamber seats. Later on his term he decided to form a coalition with URD and FND, the so-called Ancha Base (broad base), which gave his government a 65.7% majority in the Chamber of Deputies. In short, cabinet posts can be used by presidents to obtain political support beyond their own party, thus eventually allowing the chief executive to overcome a minority situation determined by the ballots cast in the last election.
IV. Conclusion
This work-in-progress tentatively formulated a spatial theory of presidential policymaking and tested the latter on Venezuelan data. While our theory allowed us to deductively derive hypotheses on the frequency at which presidents issue vetoes and the fate of bills initiated by the presidents, the available evidence failed to confirm our predictions. Our predictions were that presidents should emit no vetoes and that executive-sponsored bills should suffer no defeat. The negative results generated by the tests made us question the key assumption on which our model was premised, namely, the assumption that presidents operate under complete information. Such strict assumption led us to model presidents as playing a merely anticipatory role in policymaking, a role that our data did not corroborate. The question, then, became: what factors not captured by the model could be driving Venezuelan presidents to perform a more active role? We argued and found some positive evidence that position-taking strategies and the use of appointment powers aiming at the formation of coalition cabinets could partly explain why Venezuelan presidents were more active than expected by our theory. However, our evidence is too suggestive, and we still have a long road ahead to empirically sustain our claims with more certainty.
Finally, a note on how cabinet formation relates to spatial models is in order. It is difficult for the latter to capture the importance of cabinet formation in a presidential system because they represent political actors as motivated only by policy-seeking concerns, whereas the drafting of a party to the executive often signifies that politicians are willing to trade off their policy ideals for the benefits of office. This is an important theoretical challenge that needs to be faced up by analysts of Latin American presidentialism. In the present state of our model, however, we were only able to consider the cabinet-making process as exogenous to the policy-making process -i.e. the equilibrium described in Section II applies to a game starting with P's decision to propose a bill or not to the legislature. This, of course, is not appropriate, and we will need to endogenize it so that the equilibrium of the game takes the president's design of cabinet into account. For the limited purposes of this paper, we offered only some tentative, ad hoc arguments about the how cabinet-making can help presidents in their dealings with legislative parties. (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) ? 9 ? 1.3 Brazil (1946 ( -1964 ( ) ? 260 ? 13.7 Brazil (1985 ( -1996 ? 870 ? 72.5
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